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Abstract
In a normative environment an agent’s actions are
not only directed by its goals but also by norms.
Here, potential conflicts among the agent’s goals
and norms makes decision-making challenging.
We therefore seek to answer the following ques-
tions: (i) how should an agent act in a normative en-
vironment? and (ii) how can the agent explain why
it acted in a certain way? We propose a solution in
which a normative planning problem serves as the
basis for a practical reasoning approach based on
argumentation. The properties of the best plan(s)
w.r.t. goal achievement and norm compliance are
mapped to arguments that are used to explain why
a plan is justified, using a dialogue game.
1 Introduction
Agents in normative systems must be able to reason about
actions in pursuit of their goals, but must also consider the
regulative norms imposed on them. Such norms define obli-
gations and prohibitions on their behavior, and to avoid pun-
ishment, agents must comply with norms while pursuing their
goals. However, if norm compliance hinders a more impor-
tant goal or norm, an agent should consider violating it. To
decide how to act, an agent thus needs to generate all plans
and weigh up the importance of goal achievement and norm
compliance against the cost of goal failure and norm violation
in different plans. Although some reasoning frameworks do
this [Broersen et al., 2001; Kollingbaum and Norman, 2003],
little attention has been paid to explaining the agents’ deci-
sion making in such frameworks. Such explanation is im-
portant in contexts including human-agent teams and agent
debugging, and to provide explanation, we propose utilising
formal argumentation.
Argumentation has been applied to inconsistency han-
dling and decision-making [Dung, 1995; Amgoud and Prade,
2009], and its dialogical interpretation makes it an appropri-
ate tool to generate explanations for decisions [Fan and Toni,
2015; Caminada et al., 2014b]. Although argumentation has
been extensively used in practical reasoning (e.g., [Atkinson
and Bench-Capon, 2007]), integrating the reasoning and di-
alogical aspect of argumentation for decision-making and its
explanation has not been addressed by existing approaches.
In this paper we propose an argumentation-based approach
to normative practical reasoning using a dialogue game to
provide an intuitive overview of agent’s reasoning. In achiev-
ing this aim, the following contributions are made: (i) we for-
malise a set of argument schemes and critical questions [Wal-
ton, 1996] aimed at checking plan justifiability with respect
to goal satisfaction and norm compliance/violation; (ii) we
offer a novel decision criterion that identifies the best plan(s)
both in the presence and absence of preferences over goals
and norms; and (iii) we investigate the properties of the best
plan(s). These properties, together with Caminada’s Socratic
dialogu game [Caminada et al., 2014a], are used to generate
an explanation for the justifiability of the best plan(s).
2 Model
This section introduces a model for normative practical rea-
soning based on STRIPS planning [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971].
Definition 1 (Normative Planning Problem). A normative
planning problem is a tuple P = 〈FL, ∆, A,G,N〉 where
FL is a set of fluents; ∆ ⊆ FL is the initial state; A is a finite,
non-empty set of durative actions; G is the set of agent goals;
and N is a set of action-based norms imposed on the agent.
Fluents FL is a set of domain fluents. A literal l is a flu-
ent or its negation. For a set of literals L, we define L+ =
{fl s.t. fl ∈ L} and L− = {fl s.t. ¬fl ∈ L}. L is well-
defined if L+ ∩ L− = ∅. For a state s ⊆ FL, s+ are fluents
considered true, and s− = FL\s+. A state s satisfies lit-
eral fl, denoted as s |= fl, if fl ∈ s, and satisfies literal ¬fl,
denoted s |= ¬fl, if fl 6∈ s.
Actions An action a = 〈pr, ps, d〉 is composed of well-
defined sets of literals pr, ps that represent a’s pre- and post-
conditions respectively, and a number d ∈ N representing the
action’s duration. Given an action a = 〈pr, ps, d〉, we write
pr(a), ps(a) and d(a) for pr, ps, and d. Postconditions are
divided into add (ps(a)+) and delete (ps(a)−) postcondition
sets. An action a can be executed in state s iff the state satis-
fies its preconditions. The postconditions of a durative action
are applied in the state s at which the action ends, by adding
the positive postconditions belonging to ps(a)+ and deleting
the negative postconditions belonging to ps(a)−.
Goals Achievement goals instantaneously achieve a certain
state of affairs. Each g ∈ G is a well-defined set of literals
g = {r1, . . . , rn}, known as goal requirements (denoted as
ri), that should be satisfied in the state to satisfy the goal.
Norms An action-based norm is defined as a tuple n =
〈d o, acon, asub, dl〉, where d o ∈ {o, f} is the deontic op-
erator denoting obligation or prohibition; acon ∈ A is the
action that activates the norm; asub ∈ A is the action that is
the subject of the obligation or prohibition; and dl ∈ N is the
norm deadline relative to the completion of the execution of
the action acon, the activation condition of the norm.
2.1 Semantics
Let P = 〈FL,∆, A,G,N〉 be a normative planning problem.
Also let pi = 〈(a0, 0), . . . , (an, tan)〉 be a sequence of ac-
tions such that @(ai, tai), (aj , taj ) ∈ pi s.t. tai ≤ taj < tai+
d(ai), (ai, aj) ∈ cf action, where cf action is defined below.
Definition 2 (Conflicting Actions). Actions ai and aj have
a concurrency conflict iff the preconditions or postconditions
of ai contradict the preconditions or postconditions of aj .
cf action = {(ai, aj) s.t. ∃r ∈ pr(ai) ∪ ps(ai),
¬r ∈ pr(aj) ∪ ps(aj)}
The duration of a sequence of actions pi is calculated as
Makespan(pi) = max (tai +d(ai)). The execution of pi from
a starting state s0 brings about a sequence of states S(pi) =
〈s0, . . . , sm〉 for every discrete time interval from 0 to m =
Makespan(pi). The transition relation between two states is
as follows. Let Ak be the set of action, time pairs such that
the actions end at state sk. State sk results from removing
all delete postconditions and adding all add postconditions of
actions in Ak to state sk−1. I.e., ∀ 0 < k ≤ m :
sk =
(sk−1 \
⋃
a∈Ak
ps(a)−) ∪ ⋃
a∈Ak
ps(ai)
+ Ak 6= ∅
sk−1 Ak = ∅
pi satisfies a goal if there is a state that satisfies the goal:
pi |= g iff ∃ sk ∈ S(pi) s.t. sk |= g. The set of satisfied goals
by pi is denoted Gpi .
pi complies with an obligation if the action that is the sub-
ject of the obligation, asub, occurs during the compliance pe-
riod (i.e., between when the condition holds and when the
deadline expires):
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon), (asub, tasub) ∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), dl + tacon + d(acon))
If asub does not occur during the compliance period, the
obligation is violated: pi 6|= n.
pi complies with a prohibition if the prohibition’s subject
action asub does not occur during the compliance period:
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon) ∈ pi,@(asub, tasub) ∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), dl + tacon + d(acon))
If asub occurs during the compliance period, the prohibition
is violated: pi 6|= n.
We assume that all norm deadlines end before
Makespan(pi). Therefore, all activated norms in pi (de-
noted as Npi) are either complied with (denoted Ncmp(pi)) or
violated (denoted Nvol(pi)) by time m. Another assumption
made is deontic detachment [Andrighetto et al., 2013],
meaning that norm instances are unique, even if a norm is
invoked several times.
2.2 Conflict
In this section we consider several types of conflict, defining
which sequences of action within a plan are determined to be
in conflict. We consider a running example where an agent
has the goals of going on strike; submitting a report; and get-
ting a certificate of some sort. However, if the agent goes on
maternity leave, it cannot go to the office and submit the re-
port. Moreover, if it goes on strike, it cannot go to office or
attend meetings.
Definition 3 (Conflicting Goals). Goal gi and gj are in con-
flict if satisfying them requires bringing about conflicting
state of affairs.
cf goal = {(gi, gj) s.t. ∃r ∈ gi,¬r ∈ gj}
Example 1. The goal strike, made up of fluents
{union member, ¬at office, ¬meeting attended} and
goal submission, with fluents {at office, report finalised}
are in conflict.
Definition 4 (Conflicting Obligations and Goals). Norm n =
〈o, acon, asub, dl〉 and goal g are in conflict if executing action
asub — the subject of the obligation — brings about postcon-
ditions that are in conflict with the requirements of g.
cf goalobl = {(g, n) s.t. ∃r ∈ g,¬r ∈ ps(asub)}
Example 2. Goal strike and norm n1 =
〈o, get company funding , attend meeting, 2〉, oblig-
ing meeting attendance if company funding is used are
in conflict, since postcondition meeting attended of
attend meeting is incompatible with the fluents of strike.
Definition 5 (Conflicting Prohibitions and Goals). A prohibi-
tion norm n = 〈f, acon, asub, dl〉 and a goal g are in conflict,
if the postconditions of asub contribute to satisfying g via r
(and r cannot be brought about by any other action.), but ex-
ecuting action asub is prohibited by norm n.
cf goalpro = {(g, n) s.t. ∃r ∈ g, r ∈ ps(asub)}
Example 3. submission = {at office, report finalised}
and n2 = 〈f, take maternity leave, go to office, 6〉 are in
conflict since taking maternity leave prevents the agent from
going to the office and hence prevents fulfilling the goal of
submission: (submission, n2) ∈ cf goalpro.
The entire set of conflicting goals and norms is defined as:
cf goalnorm = cf goalobl ∪ cf goalpro.
Definition 6 (Conflicting Obligations). n1 = 〈o, acon, asub,
dl〉 and n2 = 〈o, bcon, bsub, dl′〉 are in conflict in the context
of pi if the obliged actions in n1, i.e., asub, and n2, i.e., bsub
have a concurrency conflict; and action asub is in progress
during the entire period over which the agent is obliged to
execute action bsub.
cfpioblobl = {(n1, n2) s.t. (acon, tacon), (bcon, tbcon) ∈ pi;
(acon, bsub) ∈ cf action; tasub ∈
[tacon + d(acon), tacon + d(acon) + dl); [tbcon+
d(bcon), tbcon + d(bcon) + dl
′) ⊆ [tasub , tasub + d(asub))}
Example 4. Due to the concurrency conflict between ac-
tions attend meeting and attend interview, in n1 =
〈o, get company funding , attend meeting, 2〉 and n4 =
〈o, take theory test, attend interview, 2〉 and depending
on the way actions are sequenced in a plan, it is possible that
in some pi: (n1, n4) ∈ cf pioblobl.
Definition 7 (Conflicting Obligations and Prohibitions). An
obligation n1 = 〈o, acon, asub, dl〉 and a prohibition n2 =
〈f, bcon, asub, dl′〉 are in conflict in the context of pi if n2 for-
bids the agent to execute action asub during the entire period
over which obligation n1 obliges the agent to take asub.
cf pioblpro = {(n1, n2) s.t. (acon, tacon), (bcon, tbcon) ∈ pi;
[tacon + d(acon), tacon + d(acon) + dl) ⊆
[tbcon + d(bcon), tbcon + d(bcon) + dl
′)}
Example 5. The obligation and prohibition n1 =
〈o, get company funding , attend meeting, 2〉, and n3 =
〈f, take maternity leave, attend meeting, 6〉 can be in
conflict in some pi as they require and forbid attending a meet-
ing. Thus, for some pi, (n1, n3) ∈ cf pioblpro.
The two sets cf pioblobl and cf
pi
oblpro constitute the set of con-
flicting norms: cf pinorm = cf
pi
oblobl ∪ cf pioblpro.
Definition 8 (Plan). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0),
. . . , (an, tan)〉 s.t. @(ai, tai), (aj , taj ) ∈ pi s.t. tai ≤ taj <
tai + d(ai), (ai, aj) ∈ cf action is a plan for the normative
planning problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N) iff:
• Only the fluents in ∆ hold in the initial state: s0 = ∆
• the preconditions of action ai holds at time tai and
throughout the execution of ai:
∀k ∈ [tai , tai + d(ai)), sk |= pr(ai)
• the set of goals satisfied by plan pi is a non-empty (Gpi 6=
∅) consistent subset of goals:
Gpi ⊆ G and @gi, gj ∈ Gpi s.t. (gi, gj) ∈ cf goal
• there is no conflict between the goals satisfied and norms
complied with:
@g ∈ Gpi and n ∈ Ncmp(pi) s.t. (g, n) ∈ cf goalnorm
Note that since norms are action-based and there is no pos-
sibility of executing conflicting actions, there will be no con-
flict between the norms complied with in a plan.
We consider a set of plans Π, and in the next section deal
with the problem of choosing the best plan from this set.
3 Identifying the Best Plan
The conflict between an agent’s goals and norms often makes
it impossible for the agent to satisfy all its goals while com-
plying with all norms triggered in a plan. We begin by con-
sidering how to treat each plan as a proposal of actions and
how to use argumentation schemes to check the justifiability
of a plan proposal with respect to conflicts and preferences.
In Section 3.2, we then identify the best plan from the justi-
fied subset.
3.1 Generating Arguments
An argumentation framework (AF) consists of a set of ar-
guments and attacks between them [Dung, 1995]: AF =
〈Arg , Att〉, Att ⊆ Arg × Arg . In scheme-based approaches
[Walton, 1996] arguments are expressed in natural language
and a set of critical questions is associated with each scheme,
identifying how the scheme can be attacked. Below, we in-
troduce a set of argument schemes and critical questions to
reason about a plan proposal with respect to the goals it satis-
fies and norms it complies with or violates.
Definition 9 (Plan Argument Scheme Argpi). A plan argu-
ment claims that a proposed sequence of actions should be
executed because it satisfies a set of goals, and complies with
a set of norms while violating some other norms:
- In the initial state ∆
- The agent should execute sequence of actions pi
- Which will satisfy set of goalsGpi and complies with set
of norms Ncmp(pi) and violates set of norms Nvol(pi)
Definition 10 (Goal Argument Scheme Argg). A goal argu-
ment claims that a feasible goal should be satisfied:
- Goal g is feasible1 for the agent
- Therefore, satisfying g is required.
The set of goal argument is denoted as ArgG.
Definition 11 (Norm Argument Scheme Argn). A norm ar-
gument claims that an activated norm should be complied
with:
- n is an activated norm imposed on the agent in plan pi
- Therefore, complying with n is required in pi.
The set of norm argument for a plan is denoted as ArgNpi .
Critical Questions for the Plan Argument Scheme
CQ1: Is there a goal argument which attacks Argpi? This
CQ results in an undercut attack (asymmetric by nature)
from a goal argument to a plan argument, when the goal
is not satisfied in the plan:
∀Argg ∈ ArgG if pi 6|= g then (Argg, Argpi) ∈ Att
CQ2: Is there a norm argument which attacks Argpi? This
CQ results in an undercut from a norm argument to a
plan argument, when the norm is violated in the plan:
∀Argn ∈ ArgNpi if pi 6|= n then (Argn, Argpi) ∈ Att
Critical Questions for the Goal Argument Scheme
CQ3: What goal arguments might attack Argg? This CQ re-
sults in a rebut attack (symmetric by definition) between
arguments for conflicting goals:
∀Argg, Argg′ ∈ ArgG
if (g, g′) ∈ cf goal then (Argg, Argg′) ∈ Att
CQ4: What norm arguments might attack Argg? This CQ
results in a rebut attack between arguments for a goal
and a norm that are in conflict:
∀Argg ∈ ArgG, Argn ∈ ArgNpi
if (g, n) ∈ cf goalnorm then (Argg, Argn) ∈ Att
1A goal is feasible if there is at least one plan that satisfies it.
Critical Questions for the Norm Argument Scheme
CQ4: What goal arguments might attack the norm presented
by Argn? The previous critical question is associated
with argument schemes for norms as well as goals,
hence the repetition of the critical question.
∀Argg ∈ ArgG, Argn ∈ ArgNpi
if (n, g) ∈ cf goalnorm then (Argn, Argg) ∈ Att
CQ5: What norm arguments might attack the norm presented
by Argn? Conflict between two norms is defined as a
contextual conflict that depends upon the context of the
plan in which the norms are activated.
∀Argn, Argn′ ∈ ArgNpi
if (n, n′) ∈ cfpinorm then (Argn, Argn′) ∈ Att
Preferences between arguments distinguish an attack from
a defeat (i.e., a successful attack [Amgoud and Cayrol,
2002]). The attack from one argument to another is a de-
feat if the latter argument is not preferred over the former.
However, as discussed in [Prakken, 2012], rebuttal attacks
are preference-dependent, whereas undercuts are preference-
independent. Thus, attacks due to CQ3, CQ4 and CQ5 need
preferences to be resolved, while attacks caused by CQ1 and
CQ2 are preference-independent, always resulting in defeat.
We definegn as a partial preorder onG∪N . gn denotes
the strict relation corresponding to gn. Also, (α, β) ∈ ∼gn
iff (α, β) ∈ gn and (β, α) ∈ gn. The preferences between
the goal and norm arguments result from the preference be-
tween these entities: (Argα, Argβ) ∈  iff (α, β) ∈ gn.
An AF for a plan proposal consists of the argument for
the plan itself, a set of arguments for goals and arguments
for norms that are activated in that plan. Although the set of
goal arguments in AFs for plan proposals remain the same
across the AFs, the set of norm arguments differs between
AFs depending on the norms that are activated by the plan
proposal in each AF.
Definition 12 (Plan Proposal AF). The AF for plan proposal
pi is AFpi = 〈Arg ,Def 〉, where Arg = Argpi∪ArgG∪ArgNpi
and Def is defined as: ∀Argα,Argβ ∈ Arg , (Argα,Argβ) ∈
Def iff (Argα,Argβ) ∈ AttCQ1−5 and (Argβ ,Argα) 6∈.
The next section explains how an AF for a plan proposal is
evaluated and used to identify the best plan(s).
3.2 Evaluating the Argumentation Framework
Argumentation semantics [Dung, 1995] are a means for eval-
uating arguments in an AF. Among the proposed seman-
tics are the credulous preferred semantics which several
authors have suggested [Caminada, 2006; Prakken, 2006;
Oren, 2013] are appropriate for reasoning about actions.
Caminada [2006] provides an intuitive way to identify the sta-
tus of arguments w.r.t. various semantics through labellings.
An argument is, respectively, labelled in, out and undec, if it
is acceptable, rejected and undecided under a certain seman-
tics. In a complete labelling (Lcmp), an argument is labelled
in iff all its attackers are labelled out, and is labelled out iff
there exists an attacker for it that is labelled in. A complete
labelling in which the set of arguments labelled in are max-
imal (w.r.t. set inclusion) is a preferred labelling (Lpr). An
argument is credulously accepted under preferred semantics
if it is labelled in by at least one preferred labelling.
Definition 13 (Justified Plans). Plan pi is justified if Argpi
is labelled in by at least one preferred labelling for AFpi:
∃ Lpr s.t. Argpi ∈ in(L).
Although all justified plans are internally consistent, they
can still be disagreed with externally. That is, there might be
further criteria to take into account when identifying the best
plan among justified plans. We define the criteria for the best
plan(s) using an established set ordering principle in argu-
mentation, the Democratic principle: (Si, Sj) ∈ D iff ∀β ∈
Sj \ Si,∃α ∈ Si \ Sj s.t. (α, β) ∈ . Since preferences over
goals and norms are partial, comparing two plans based on
the set of goals and norms is not always possible. Therefore,
absent such preference information, the best plan(s) satisfies
the most goals while violating the fewest norms. We start by
defining the goal-dominant and norm-dominant plans, based
on which a better than relation between plans is defined.
Let GΠ = {Gpi1 , Gpi2 , . . . , Gpin}, where Gpii is the set of
goals satisfied in plan pii .
Definition 14 (Goal-dominance). Plan pii goal-dominates pij
denoted as (pii, pij) ∈ ≥G if
1. DG is a total preorder on GΠ and (Gpii , Gpij ) ∈ DG; or
2. |Gpii | ≥ |Gpij | (i.e., ifDG is not a total preorder onGΠ).
>G and ∼G are strictly and equally dominant version of ≥G.
Let Nvol(Π) = {Nvol(pi1), Nvol(pi2), . . . , Nvol(pin)}, where
Nvol(pii) is the set of norms violated in plan pii.
Definition 15 (Norm-dominance). Plan pii norm-dominates
pij denoted as (pii, pij) ∈ ≥N if
1. DN is a total preorder on Nvol(Π) and
(Nvol(pii), Nvol(pij)) ∈ DN ; or
2. |Nvol(pii)| ≥ |Nvol(pij)| (i.e., ifDN is not a total preorder
on Nvol(Π)).
>N and∼N are strictly and equally dominant version of≥N .
Definition 16 (Plan Comparison). Plan pii is better than pij ,
denoted (pii, pij) ∈ >pi , iff:
1. pii is justified and pij is not; or
2. pii and pij are both justified and (pii, pij) ∈ >G; or
3. pii and pij are both justified and (pii, pij) ∈ ∼G but
(pij , pii) ∈ >N .
Plan pii is as good as pij , denoted (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi , iff (pii, pij) 6∈
>pi and (pij , pii) 6∈ >pi .
The relation >pi is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive,
while ∼pi is an equivalence relation on Π.
Definition 17 (Equivalence Classes). Given pi ∈ Π, let
[pii] denote the equivalence class to which pii belongs.
([pii], [pij ]) ∈ ≥ iff (pii, pij) ∈ >pi or (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi .
Definition 18 (Best Plan(s)). Plan pii is (one of) the best
plan(s) for the agent to execute iff
• pii is justified, and
• @pij such that ([pij ], [pii]) ∈ ≥.
Example 6. Assume an agent with three goals
strike, submission (c.f., Example 1), and certificate =
{course fee paid, theory test done, interviewed} and
four norms n1, n2, n3, and n4 (c.f., Examples 2, 3, 4, and 5).
Assume that the agent prefers satisfying goal submission
to complying with norm n2: submission  n2, and prefers
complying with n4 over n1: n4  n1. Let pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4 ∈ Π:
• pi1 |= submission, Npi1 = {n1}, Ncmp(pi1) = {n1}
• pi2 |= submission, certificate, Npi2 = {n1, n4},
Ncmp(pi2) = {n4}, Nvol(pi2) = {n1}
• pi3 |= submission, certificate, Npi3 = {n1, n2, n3, n4}
Ncmp(pi3) = {n3, n4}, Nvol(pi3) = {n1, n2}
• pi4 |= strike, certificate, Npi4 = {n1, n2, n3, n4},
Ncmp(pi4) = {n2, n3, n4}, Nvol(pi4) = {n1}
Figure 1 displays the argumentation graph associated with
each of these plans2. Plan pi1 is not justified, whereas pi2, pi3
and pi4 all are. Thus, the first condition in Definition 18 holds
for the last three plans. Since the preferences provided over
goals and norms is minimal, in this example the number of
goals satisfied and norms violated determines the best plans
as follows: although |Gpi2 | = |Gpi3 | = |Gpi4 |, |Nvol(pi2)| =
|Nvol(pi4)| < |Nvol(pi3)|. Therefore, pi2  pi3, pi4  pi3, and
pi2 ∼ pi4, which makes pi2 and pi4 the best plans.
3.3 Properties
We now consider the properties of our system with regards to
the rationality postulates [Caminada and Amgoud, 2007], and
investigate the properties of the best plan(s) and the preferred
extensions that include it.
Property 1. Closure: The conclusions of any extension (in
labelled arguments) are closed under strict rules.
Proof. Since all arguments are built on defeasible rules, the
property follows immediately.
Property 2. Direct Consistency: The conclusions of any ex-
tension are consistent.
Proof. Suppose the conclusions of extension E are inconsis-
tent, i.e., there are arguments Argα, Argβ ∈ E such that:
- Argα’s conclusion requires executing plan pi and Argβ’s
conclusion requires satisfying goal g/complying with norm
n, while g is not satisfied/n is violated in pi. Thus, Argβ de-
featsArgα; E is not conflict-free and cannot be an extension.
- Argα’s conclusion requires satisfying goal g/complying
with norm n and Argβ’s conclusion requires satisfying goal
g/complying with norm n′, while g/n and g′/n′ are incon-
sistent. Thus, Argα attacks Argβ and vice versa. Due to the
preferences, at least one of these attacks is identified as defeat
and therefore E is not conflict-free and not an extension.
Property 3. Indirect Consistency: The closure under strict
rules of the conclusions of any extension is consistent.
Proof. Follows immediately from lack of strict rules.
Property 4. If a plan argument is labelled in by preferred
labelling L, the arguments representing all the goals that it
does not satisfy and norms it violates are labelled out by L
and vice versa:
Argpi ∈ in(L)⇔ Argg∈G\Gpi ∪Argn∈Nvol(pi) ⊆ out(L).
2st, sub and cer stand for strike, submission and certificate .
Proof. Every preferred labelling is a complete labelling. An
argument is labelled in by a complete labelling iff all its at-
tackers are labelled out. Therefore, a plan argument is la-
belled in by a preferred labelling iff all its attackers, namely
the arguments for goals that it does not satisfy and norms that
it violates, are labelled out by that labelling.
Property 5. If a plan argument is labelled in by preferred
labelling L, the arguments representing all the goals that it
satisfies and norms it complies with are also labelled in:
Argpi ∈ in(L)⇒ Argg∈Gpi ∪ArgNcmp(pi) ⊆ in(L).
Proof. Since Argpi ∈ in(L), from Property 4 we know
that Argg∈G\Gpi ∪ Argn∈Nvol(pi) ⊆ out(L). We also know
from the definition of a plan that Argg∈Gpi ∪ Argn∈Ncmp(pi)
is conflict free. Since all possible attackers of Argg∈Gpi ∪
Argn∈Ncmp(pi) belong to Argg∈G\Gpi ∪ Argn∈Nvol(pi) and
Argg∈G\Gpi ∪Argn∈Nvol(pi) are all labelled out, we conclude
that Argg∈Gpi ∪Argn∈Ncmp(pi) ⊆ in(L).
Note that from Argg∈Gpi ∪ Argn∈Ncmp(pi) ⊆ in(L) one
cannot conclude that Argpi ∈ in(L), as there might be justi-
fied goals or norms not satisfied or complied with in the plan.
Property 6. There is no more than one preferred labelling in
which Argpi ∈ in(L).
Proof. From Properties 4 and 5 we know that if Argpi ∈
in(L) then Argg∈G\Gpi ∪ Argn∈Nvol(pi) ⊆ out(L) and
Argg∈Gpi ∪ Argn∈Ncmp(pi) ⊆ in(L). Since every preferred
labelling is a complete labelling and the following property
holds for complete labellings: if out(Lcmp1) = out(Lcmp2)
then Lcmp1 = Lcmp2; we conclude that there is no more than
one preferred labelling in which Argpi ∈ in(L).
Property 7. If Argpi ∈ in(L), L is a stable labelling.
Proof. In Property 4 we showed that if Argpi ∈ in(L)
then Argg∈G\Gpi ∪ Argn∈Nvol(pi) ⊆ out(L) and Argg∈Gpi ∪
Argn∈Ncmp(pi) ⊆ in(L), which makes the undec(L) = ∅. A
preferred labelling with undec(L) = ∅ is a stable labelling.
Therefore, L is a stable labelling.
Property 8. Letgn be a total preorder onG∪N and there-
fore  be a total preorder on goal and norm arguments. If
Argpi ∈ in(L), and the set of arguments for the most pre-
ferred goals and norms, Pref (Arg), is conflict free, all argu-
ments belong to Pref (Arg) are labelled in by L.
Proof. Elements of set Pref (Arg) cannot be defeated, since
the set is conflict-free and the remaining arguments belong
to Arg \ Pref (Arg). The latter cannot defeat elements
of Pref (Arg), because this would imply an attack from
a less preferred argument to a more preferred one has re-
sulted in a defeat, which is contrary to assumption. As-
sume that ∃Argα ∈ Pref (Arg) such that Argα 6∈ in(L).
If @Argβ ∈ in(L) s.t. (Argα, Argβ) ∈ Def then Argα
should have been labelled in by L otherwise it is contrary
to the assumption of maximality of preferred labellings. If
∃Argβ ∈ in(L) s.t. (Argα, Argβ) ∈ Def then ∃Argγ ∈
in(L) s.t. (Argγ , Argα) ∈ Def , which is contradictory to
Argpi1 Argst
Argsub
Argcer
Argn1 Argpi2 Argst
Argsub
Argcer
Argn1
Argn4
Argpi3 Argst
Argsub
Argcer
Argn1
Argn2
Argn3 Argn4
Argpi4 Argst
Argsub
Argcer
Argn1
Argn2
Argn3 Argn4
Figure 1: Argumentation Graph for plans pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4
the fact thatArgα cannot be defeated. Therefore, all elements
of Pref (Arg) are labelled in by in(L).
4 Explaining the Justifiability of the Best Plan
In this section we exploit an existing dialogue for preferred
semantics known as Socratic Discussion [Caminada et al.,
2014a] to provide an explanation for the justifiability of the
best plan(s). Deciding if an argument is in at least one pre-
ferred extension amounts to deciding if it is in at least in one
admissible extension (i.e. it is labelled in by at least one ad-
missible labelling). In an admissible labelling if an argument
is labelled in, all its attackers are labelled out, and if an argu-
ment is labelled out, it has an attacker that is labelled in.
Definition 19 (Socratic Discussion [Caminada et al., 2014a]).
Let AF = 〈Arg,Def 〉. The sequence of moves [∆1,∆2,
. . . ,∆n] (n ≥ 1) is a Socratic discussion iff: (i) each odd
move (M-move) is an argument labelled in; (ii) each even
move (S-move) is an argument labelled out; (iii) each argu-
ment moved by S attacks an argument moved by M earlier
in the dialogue; (iv) each argument moved by M attacks an
argument moved by S in the previous step; (v) S-moves can-
not be repeated. Player S wins the discussion if there is an
M-move and an S-move containing the same argument. Oth-
erwise, the winner is the player that makes the last move.
Given that the agent’s best plans(s) pi is labelled in by at
least one preferred labelling, player M is guaranteed a win-
ning strategy in a Socratic discussion with ∆1 = in(Argpi).
The even moves in the rest of dialogue are arguments labelled
out, which according to Property 4 are goals not satisfied or
norms violated in pi. On the other hand, the rest of odd moves
in the dialogue are arguments labelled in, which according to
Property 5 are goals satisfied or norms complied with in pi.
Since each odd move attacks the even move in the previous
step, during a dialogue the agent is able to dialectically ex-
plain why it did not satisfy a goal or violate a norm, which
are the two causes of attacks on plan proposals.
Example 7. This example shows a Socratic discus-
sion ∆ = [in(Argpi4), out(Argsub), in(Argst), out(Argn1),
in(Argn4)] for plan pi4.
- M: Plan pi4 is (one of) the best plan(s) and is justifiable.
- S: Why does the plan not satisfy goal submission?
- M: As it satisfies goal strike, attacking goal submission.
- S: Why does the plan violate norm n1?
- M: Because the plan satisfies norm n4 that attacks norm n1.
5 Related Work
One of the most well-known scheme-based approach in prac-
tical reasoning is [Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007]. Re-
cently, [Oren, 2013] has proposed a similar scheme-based
approach for normative practical reasoning where arguments
are constructed for a sequence of actions. Similar to the lat-
ter approach, we construct arguments for plans rather than
actions. [Oren, 2013] assumes that conflicts within and be-
tween goals and norms are inferred from paths, rather than
being obtained from the model. Thus, although it is possible
to explain why one path is preferred over another, it is not
possible to understand why a path does not satisfy a goal or
violate a norm. In contrast, we explicitly consider why an
agent does not satisfy a goal, or violate a norm. In addition,
in this work the explanation of justifiability of why a plan is
(one of) the best plan(s) for the agent to execute is formulated
using a dialogue game for preferred semantics.
There are several applications where dialogue games are
used for explanation purposes [Zhong et al., 2014; Fan and
Toni, 2015; Caminada et al., 2014b]. In [Zhong et al., 2014]
and [Fan and Toni, 2015] admissible dispute trees developed
for Assumption-based Argumentation [Dung et al., 2009] are
used to provide explanation for why a certain decision is bet-
ter than another. In [Caminada et al., 2014b] a dialogical
proof based on the grounded semantics [Caminada and Pod-
laszewski, 2012] is created to justify the actions executed in a
plan. Despite the popularity of the preferred semantics, they
have not been used for explanation in such contexts, and our
work is the first to do so in the practical reasoning domain.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In contrast to existing argument based practical reasoning ap-
proaches, we propose a framework that integrates both the
reasoning and dialogical aspects of argumentation to perform
normative practical reasoning. In doing so, we answer the
question of how an agent should act in a normative environ-
ment under conflicting goals and norms. Moreover, our ap-
proach can generate explanation for agent behaviour using an
argumentation-based dialogue.
In future work we will investigate temporal solutions to
addressing goal-goal and goal-norm conflict, similar to how
conflicts between norms are handled. We also intend to em-
pirically evaluate the effectiveness of our explanations, deter-
mining how likely a human is to accept the recommendation
of a system regarding the best plan(s).
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